

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ERDA-07 AF-10 ARA-14 CIAE-00  
DODE-00 EA-09 EUR-12 PM-05 H-02 INR-07 IO-14  
L-03 NASA-02 NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02  
PA-02 PRS-01 OES-07 SS-15 USIA-15 ERDE-00 /155 W  
-----050100 030022Z /64

P R 021753Z AUG 77

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9929

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USMISSION NATO

USMISSION USUN NY

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E.OM.11652: N/A

TAGS: PARM, CCD, NL

SUBJ: CCD: NETHERLANDS AUGUST 2 PLENARY STATEMENT ON CHEMICAL  
WEAPONS

1. SUMMARY: ON AUGUST 2 NETHERLANDS REP GAVE COMPREHENSIVE  
STATEMENT ON CCD PLENARY ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) ISSUES,  
CONCENTRATING ON DEFINITIONS OF AGENTS TO BE BANNED AND ON  
VERIFICATION PROVISIONS OF A CW AGREEMENT. IN ADDTION,  
DUTCH REP STATED THAT NETHERLANDS ARMED FORCES DO NOT  
POSSESS LETHAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND INCAPACITANTS. END SUMMARY.

2. NETHERLANDS REP (VAN DER KLAAUW), SPEAKING IN AUGUST 2  
CCD PLENARY, STATED THAT ALTHOUGH A NUMBER OF CHEMICAL  
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WEAPONS (CW) QUESTIONS AWAIT SOLUTION, PROGRESS ON OTHER  
ISSUES NEED NOT BE IMPEDED. THIS, HE SAID, WAS THE REASON  
WHY THE NETHERLANDS HAD ADVOCATED CREATION OF A CCD  
WORKING GROUP, SO THAT CCD COULD REPORT CONSENSUS VIEWS  
ON A SIGNIFICANT PART OF THE CW PROBLEM TO THE UNGA.  
NETHERLANDS REP STATED HE IS "NOT CONVINCED THAT THE ONLY  
WAY TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THE FIELD OF CHEMICAL DISARMAMENT--

SOMEWHAT IN CONTRAST TO THE TEST BAN PROBLEM -- IS TO WAIT FOR THE MAIN POWERS TO SOLVE THEIR DIFFERENCES. ALTHOUGH I REALIZE THAT THE RESPECTIVE POSITIONS OF THE MAIN MILITARY POWERS SHOULD BE DULY TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, THE CW PROBLEM IS NOT CONFINED TO THESE POWERS."

3. PRAISING THE US CONCEPT OF PRESENTING A POSSIBLE JOINT INITIATIVE IN THE FORM OF KEY ELEMENTS, NETHERLANDS REP STATED THAT CONSENSUS ADOPTION OF SUCH KEY ELEMENTS BY CCD WOULD ENABLE MORE TIMELY NOTIFICATION TO THE UNGA AND WOULD PERMIT UN MEMBERS TO BECOME ACQUAINTED WITH THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED. MENTIONING THE NEED TO MAKE PROGRESS ON CW BEFORE THE UNGA'S SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT (SSOD), SCHEDULED FOR MAY-JUNE 1978, NETHERLANDS REP INDICATED AN OPEN MIND ON HAVING AN EXTRA SESSION OF CCD THIS FALL OR BEGINNING THE SPRING SESSION IN JANUARY, APPROXIMATELY A MONTH EARLY.

4. NETHERLANDS REP INDICATED SATISFACTION ABOUT THE DEVELOPING CONSENSUS IN CCD RELATING TO A CW BAN'S COMPREHENSIVE SCOPE, BOTH WITH RESPECT TO THE TYPES OF ACTIVITIES AND THE TYPES OF AGENTS, RANGING FROM LETHAL AGENTS TO INCAPACITANTS. ACTIVITIES TO BE BANNED, HE SAID, WOULD BE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, STOCKPILING, TRANSFER, AND ACQUISITION OF CW, AS WELL AS OFFENSIVE CW TRAINING. NETHERLANDS REP SAID THAT CONDUCTING TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS ON STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION, AS SUGGESTED BY THE UK, WOULD BE UNCLASSIFIED

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USEFUL IN ARRIVING AT AN ESTIMATE OF THE TIME NEEDED FOR DESTROYING ALL STOCKPILES.

5. ON THE DEFINITIONS OF AGENTS TO BE BANNED, NETHERLANDS REP SAID THAT MORE TECHNICAL WORK IS REQUIRED IN ORDER TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN SINGLE-PURPOSE SUPERTOXIC AGENTS AND DUAL-PURPOSE TOXIC AGENTS, BETWEEN LETHAL AND NON-LETHAL AGENTS, AND BETWEEN INCAPACITANTS AND IRRITANTS. ON THE FRG PROPOSAL TO INCLUDE CRITERIA OTHER THAN TOXICITY AS A MEANS FOR APPRAISING THE POTENTIAL VALUE OF PARTICULAR CHEMICALS AS CW AGENTS, NETHERLANDS REP SAID IT WOULD PROBABLY BE DIFFICULT TO PUT SUCH CRITERIA IN TREATY LANGUAGE BUT THAT THEY COULD SERVE AS USEFUL TOOLS IN RELATION TO VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES.

6. FOLLOWING VERBATIM PASSAGE FROM NETHERLANDS STATEMENT RELATES TO COVERAGE OF BINARY WEAPONS, IRRITANTS, HERBICIDES, DEFOLIANTS, AND PROTECTIVE MEASURES. BEGIN TEXT THERE SEEMS TO BE NO DIFFERENCE OF OPINION HERE THAT BINARY WEAPONS WOULD BE PROHIBITED BY A CW-TREATY ALSO, EVEN IF THE PRE-CUSCORS WOULD NOT BE LETHAL. CONSENSUS ALSO EXISTS, IN OUR OPINION, THAT CHEMICAL MUNITIONS WOULD BE PROHIBITED BY A BAN.

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AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
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THE QUESTION WHETHER IRRITANTS AND HERBICIDES WOULD BE PROHIBITED SEEMS AS YET UNSOLVED. AS FAR AS IRRITANTS ARE CONCERNED MOST STATES, INCLUDING MY COUNTRY, WOULD LIKE TO RETAIN THE POSSIBILITY OF USING IRRITANTS FOR NON-MILITARY PURPOSES, E.G. FOR RIOT CONTROL. A COMPLETE BAN ON THE PRODUCTION AND POSSESSION OF THOSE AGENTS WOULD THEREFORE BE IMPOSSIBLE. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE WOULD NOT LIKE TO SEE THESE AGENTS USED ON THE BATTLEFIELD. NOT GOING INTO THE QUESTION WHETHER THIS IS ALREADY PROHIBITED BY THE GENEVA PROTOCOL, I WONDER IF IT IS NOT USEFUL TO EXPLORE WHETHER COMMON GROUND EXISTS ON POSSIBLE PROHIBITIONS OF THE USE OF IRRITANTS FOR MILITARY PURPOSES. THE US POSITIIN, AS INDICATED DURING THE RATIFICATION PROCESS OF THE GENEVA PROTOCOL, IS PERHPAS WORTHWHILE TO STUDY IN THE CONTEXT OF A  
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CW-TREATY. AS TO THE HERBICIDES AND DEFOLIANTS I MAY POINT OUT THAT CERTAIN RESTRICTIONS ON THEIR USE HAVE ALREADY BEEN LAID DOWN IN RECENT INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, IN PARTICULAR IN THE ENMOD-TREATY AND IN THE NEW PROTOCOLS TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS ON HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS. THE US HAS ALSO GIVEN A UNILATERAL DECLARATION ON THE MILITARY USE OF HERBICIDES AND DEFOLIANTS. HOWEVER, MY DELEGATION FEELS THAT WE SHOULD AIM AT COVERING THE USER OF HERBICIES AND DEFOLIANTS FOR MILITARY PURPOSES IN A CW-TREATY.

AS FAR AS WE KNOW, CONSENSUS EXISTS THAT PROTECTION MEASURES AGAINST CHIMICAL ATTACK WOULD CERTAINLY NOT BE PROHIBITED BY A CW-TREATY. THE GENERAL OPINION SEEMS TO BE NOW THAT PROTECTION MEASURES COULD FORM A DETERRENT AGAINST CHEMICAL WARFARE SINCE THE MILITARY EFFECTS WHICH CAN BE ACHEIVED WITH CHEMICAL WAPONS ARE CONSIDERABLY DIMINISHED IF AND WHEN THE ADVERSARY IS IN A PROTECTIVE POSTURE. ALSO BECAUSE OF THE UNCERTAINTY ON EXISITNG STOCKPILES OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, PROTECTION AGAINST CHEMICAL WARFARE SEEMS TO BE AN IMPORTANT ADDITIOONAL MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN THE SECURITY OF STATES AGAINST CHEMICAL ATTACK. SUBSTANTIVE RESEARCH HAS BEEN DONE IN SEVERAL COUNTRIES TO DEVELOP BETTER PROTECTION MEASURES AND IT SEEMS WORTHWHILE TO STIMULATE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THIS FIELD. END TEXT.

7. NETHERLANDS REP, ADDRESSING THE QUESTION OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING DECLARATION ABOUT CW STOCKPILES, INDICATED SOME UNDERSTANDING FOR THE GDR VIEW THAT STATES WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO DIVULGE COMPLETE CW STOCK INFORMATION BEFORE THEY WERE CERTAIN THE TREATY WILL ENTER INTO FORCE. AS AN ALTERNATIVE, NETHERLANDS REP SUGGESTED AN OBLIGATION TO DELCAR ALL STOCKS AS SOON AS A STATE BECOMES A PARTY, BUT THAT IN THE MEANTIME STATES GIVE UNILATERAL DECLARATIONS CONTAINING AS MUCH UNCLASSIFIED

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INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE; THIS, HE SAID, WOULD BE USEFUL IN THE PLANNING FOR STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION. ON CAPABILITIES OF DUTCH ARMED FORCES, NETHERLANDS REP STATED QUOTE IN THIS CONNECTION I AM ALLOWED TO DECLARE HERE THAT THE NETHERLANDS ARMED FORCES DO NOT POSSESS LETHAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND INCAPACITANTS. SMALL AMOUNTS OF IRRITANTS ARE AVAILABLE FOR RIOT CONTROL AND FOR DEFENSE PROTECTIVE TRAINING PURPOSES. TO STUDY PROECTION MEASURES AGAINST CHEMICAL ATTACK, VERY SMALL QUANTITIES OF SOME CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS ARE USED IN A GOVERNMENT LABORATORY. UNQUOTE.

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P R 021753Z AUG 77  
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8. STATING THAT VERIFICATION OF CW STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION  
WOULD BE A VERY IMPORTANT CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE,  
NETHERLANDS REP SAID IT IS EQUALLY IMPORTANT TO VERIFY THAT  
NO NEW CW AGENTS ARE PRODUCED. ANALYZING THIS QUESTION,  
NETHERLANDS REP DISTINGUISHED BETWEEN VERIFYING LACK OF  
PRODUCTION OF SUPERTOXIC (SINGLE-PURPOSE) AND OF TOXIC  
(DUAL-PURPOSE) AGENTS: BEGIN TEXT IN PRINCIPLE, VERIFICATION  
OF THE PRODUCTION OF SINGLE-PURPOSE AGENTS SEEMS TO BE EASIER  
THAN VERIFYING THE PRODUCTION OF DUAL-PURPOSE AGENTS. UNDER  
A CW-TREATY, THE PRODUCTION OF SINGLE-PURPOSE AGENTS WOULD  
NORMALLY BE PROHIBITED COMPLETELY AND THE DETECTION THEREFORE  
OF VERY SMALL AMOUNTS OF SUCH AGENTS WOULD BE AN INDICATION  
OF A VIOLATION OF THE TREATY. IN THIS CONNECTION I WOULD LIKE  
TO REFER TO OUR WORKING PAPER INTRODUCED ON THE 28TH OF APRIL  
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THIS YEAR (CCD/533). WITH RESPECT TO DUAL AGENTS WE ENCOUNTER  
A VERY DIFFICULT PROBLEM, SINCE LARGE AMOUNTS OF THESE  
MATERIALS ARE OFTEN PRESENT IN THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY.

HOWEVER, REALIZING THIS, WE SHOULD NOT FORGET THAT THE MILITARY THREAT TO THE HIGHLY TOXIC SINGLE-PURPOSE AGENTS IS CONSIDERABLY HIGHER THAN THE THREAT OF OTHER CHEMICAL WEAPONS, INCLUDING MOST OF THE DUAL-PURPOSE AGENTS. THE MOST IMPORTANT CLASS OF SUCH HIGHLY TOXIC SINGLE-PURPOSE AGENTS ARE FORMED BY THE NERVE-AGENTS. ONE COULD THEREFORE ARGUE THAT INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION MEASURE WITH RESPECT TO THE PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS WOULD BE CONCENTRATED ON THE POSSIBLE ILLEGAL PRODUCTION OF NERVE AGENTS AND COMPARABLE CHEMICALS, INCLUDING PRECURSORS FOR BINARY WEAPON SYSTEMS. THIS WOULD NOT EXCLUDE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION PROCEDURES WITH RESPECT TO OTHER CW-AGENTS, BUT THESE COULD BE LESS STRINGENT. END TEXT.

9. STATING THAT NATIONAL CONTROL MEANS WOULD BE INSUFFICIENT, NETHERLANDS REP CALLED FOR DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION PROCEDURES, CITING SYSTEM OF NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS STEMMING FROM NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) AS AN EXAMPLE. WITH REGARD TO DECLARED PRODUCTION FACILITIES, NETHERLANDS REP SAID IT WOULD NOT BE TOO INTRUSIVE TO VERIFY EITHER THEIR DISMANTLEMENT OR THEIR INACTIVITY (USING CAMERAS AND TAMPER-INDICATING SEALS, AS SUGGESTED BY THE US). ON THE OTHER HAND, NETHERLANDS REP SAID, THE PROBLEM OF DEVISING VERIFICATION PROVISIONS TO DEAL WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF UNDECLARED PRODUCTION FACILITIES, EITHER ALREADY EXISTING OR NEWLY BUILT, IS VERY DIFFICULT AND REQUIRES THOROUGH DISCUSSION. NETHERLANDS REP EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT ECONOMIC MONITORING OF CERTAIN CHEMICAL PRODUCTS WOULD WORK IN A COUNTRY WITH A LARGE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY, AND REFERRED TO THE UNCLASSIFIED

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RECENT NETHERLANDS WORKING PAPER ON ANALYSIS OF WASTE WATER FOR THE PRESENCE OF NERVE AGENT TRACES, DECOMPOSITION PRODUCTS, OR STARTING MATERIALS. STATING IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT FURTHER DISCUSSIONS TO ESTABLISH APPROPRIATE PROCEDURES FOR DOING THIS, NETHERLANDS REP SAID THAT THIS METHOD AND OTHERS WOULD PROVIDE ADEQUATE DETERRENCE AGAINST ILLEGAL NERVE AGENT PRODUCTION, AT THE PRICE OF A SMALL AMOUNT OF NON-INTRUSIVE ON-SITE VERIFICATION.

10. ON THE ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK TO BE ESTABLISHED IN ORDER TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH A CW BAN, NETHERLANDS REP REFERRED TO DUTCH PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT AGENCY (CCD/PV.617) AND CCD/410) BUT SAID IT WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE TO AWAIT FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CCD BEFORE COMMENTING FURTHER ON THIS SUBJECT. VANDEN HEUVEL

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## Message Attributes

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**TAGS:** PARM, NL, CCD  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
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